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DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND PILLS—A SYSTEM POPPING UNDER TOO MUCH PHYSICIAN 
DISCRETION?  A LAW-POLICY PRESCRIPTION TO MAKE DRUG APPROVAL MORE 
MEANINGFUL IN THE DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE 
 
Michael J. Malinowski* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article challenges the scope of physician discretion to engage in off-label use 
of prescription drugs.   The discretion to prescribe dimensions beyond the clinical 
research that puts new drugs on pharmacy shelves has been shaped by two historic 
influences: a legacy of physician paternalism, solidarity, autonomy, and self-
determination that predates the contemporary commercialization of medicine by more 
than half a century, and regulatory necessity due to the limits of science and innate 
crudeness of pharmaceuticals prior to the genomics revolution (drug development and 
delivery based upon genetic expression).  Although both factors have changed 
immensely, the standard for drug approval has lingered.  This article proposes that doctor 
discretion to prescribe off label must be modified and the regulatory standard for new 
drug approvals raised given the proliferation of adverse events, drug ineffectiveness, the 
need to make choices among treatment options under time pressures, the increasing 
complexity of biopharmaceuticals, health care cost pressures, and the vulnerability of 
patients—seekers of health care, not research subjects protected under the scrutiny of 
regulations to protect human subjects.  The article concludes that, although some 
physician discretion to prescribe off label still is necessary, law-policy reforms to shift 
more of the drug discovery process from the clinical care of patients to clinical research 
in drug development are long overdue.   Proposals to accomplish this, drawn from recent 
legislation and ongoing health care reform, include heightening the regulatory standards 
for new drug approvals and drug reimbursement.  
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The United States Senate held hearings in January 1970 to address widespread 
adverse events, including stokes and deaths, associated with the birth control pill—
which the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had approved for market use nearly 
a decade before.  At the time, the pill was being taken by approximately six million 
women annually, with consumption rising rapidly.2  Although the issue was serious 
health risks to women and for a medication taken solely by women, only men were 
allowed to testify.   As explained by Dr. Philip Ball,  
 
It was an enormous room, full of people.   Well, I simply told them that I was in 
                                                 
1
 The following was transcribed by the author from The Pill (PBS Home Video, 2003). 
2
 This testimony was inspired in part by BARBARA SEAMAN, THE DOCTORS’ CASE AGAINST THE Pill 
(1969).  In spite of this experience with the pill, estrogen was aggressively prescribed to postmenopausal 
women without attention to cancer risks until the late 1990s.  As explained by Dr. Groopman,  
The growth in prescriptions of estrogen for postmenopausal women can be traced to a bestseller published 
in the 1960s, Feminine Forever, by Dr. Robert A. Wilson.  It turned out that a drug company that made 
estrogen had paid Dr. Wilson to write the book.  JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 210 (2008). 
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practice, and that I was suddenly afflicted by all these young women taking the 
pill that had all these problems . . . . . Mind you, the dose of the pill in those days 
was ten times what it is now.   It was a huge blockbuster pill they used as a 
sledgehammer to drive a small nail.  You know, it was an unnecessary dose.    
      
A group of young feminists who themselves had taken the pill attended the 
hearings.   According to advocate Alice Wolfson, a leader within the group,  
 
We began to hear researcher after researcher, male after male, start saying things 
about the pill, and then one doctor I believe said “Fertilizer is to weed what 
estrogen is to cancer .  .  .  .  .”  It just all seemed so outrageous to us that we were 
not given any information when we were given the pill.  It was literally handed 
out like candy.   
 
A protest erupted, which captured more media attention than the hearings it 
disrupted.  As a result, hormone levels in the pill were slashed, the occurrence of side 
effects greatly diminished, and the FDA required manufacturers to include information in 
every package listing potential risks.  The most significant change was that women 
demanded a new kind of relationship with their doctors.  As reflected upon by Dr. 
Richard Hauskenecht: 
 
The bad patient, she’d walk in pregnant with the husband and “Here are my 
demands”—that was a phenomena of the 70s.   “I won’t have this, I will have 
that, and I won’t have this,” and they got this from the same medical political 
activist that I was.  And it was terrifying to me to hear myself give a lecture to a 
lay group about why they should not let doctors do all these things to them, and 
those same damn patients came back to my office and made those demands of me, 
and it used to upset the hell out of me. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The roles of physician and patient have changed immensely in the U.S. over the 
decades since the 1970 U.S. Senate hearings on the pill.  The “silent world of doctor and 
patient”3 at the time of the hearings still lingers to some extent today,4 but medicine has 
been commercialized and the medical profession has lost a considerable amount of its 
autonomy, solidarity, and self-determination.  Factors that have drained the sovereignty 
of the medical profession include increasing dependence on outside institutions (hospitals 
and government regulators, for example) in conjunction with the progressive 
sophistication of the practice of medicine, the commercialization of medicine, the rise of 
consumer-driven medicine in an internet age, aggressive direct-to-consumer marketing by 
the biopharmaceutical sectors which encourages patients to make drug demands on their 
                                                 
3
 See generally Jay Katz : JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) (discussing a 
“millennia of Hypocratic paternalism”).  
4
 See Susan M. Wolf, Doctor and Patient: An Unfinished Revolution, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & 
Ethics 485, 485-500 (2006).  Cf. GROOPMAN, supra note 2. 
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physicians, legislation that enables patients to check and control the flow of their medical 
information, and public and political challenges to the entire health care system with 
ongoing, sweeping federal and state reforms underway.5  Similarly, in many ways today’s 
FDA is fundamentally different from the agency that put the pill on the market in 1960.  
The FDA’s very mission has changed from policing safety and efficacy with a 
presumption in favor of caution.  Since modernization of the FDA in 1997, the agency is 
under a mandate to achieve review efficiency through increased responsiveness to 
industry during the drug approval process,6 and there is a presumption to put drugs on the 
market on a wait-and-see basis—which is what happened with Vioxx.7  More than 900 
FDA reviewers are salaried through the collection of user fees from the sponsors of the 
new drugs they regulate.8 
    
In spite of these changes, the fundamental law-policy governing drug approval 
and delivery remains vested in the past.   Specifically, this article questions broad 
physician discretion to prescribe pharmaceuticals off label.  Too much reliance is placed 
on the medical profession to develop meaningful understanding of pharmaceuticals after 
they are on the market, one patient at a time, especially in an age of unprecedented 
science precision through advances in human genetics.9  The discussion centers on the 
                                                 
5
 See generally Symposium—Patient-Centered Law and Ethics, 45 WAKE FOREST 1429 (2010); 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, HEALTH REFORM: PROSPERING IN A POST-REFORM WORLD (2010) 
[hereinafter “PWC REPORT”]. DAVID GRATZER, THE CURE, at xvi (“Between 2000 and 2006, health costs 
have soared and health insurance premiums have roughly doubled.  It’s not simply employers who feel the 
pinch. Consider a family’s perspective. . . . In fact, since the early 1970s, health spending per capita has 
increased fivefold, adjusting for inflation.”).  The employer cost of health insurance has been soaring: 
Employers during the Bush years paid handsomely for labor.  In fact, employers’ costs for employing a 
typical, median worker jumped from $19.85 per hour in 200 to $25.67 in 2006.  That’s a raise of more 
than $5 per hour, or 25%. 
 Yet the average worker saw none of the money.  Every dime—and then some—was gobbled up by 
the rising cost of employer provided health insurance . . . . 
 Look at this from the point of view of some typical American family.  Married, two kids.  
Between 2000 and 2006, their pay has barely gone up at all.  They’ve had a nice little tax cut from the 
Bush Administration, worth perhaps $500.  But they’re paying $1,100 more per year in out-of-pocket 
health care costs.Id. at xvi, quoting DAVID FRUM, COMEBACK:CONSERVATISM THAT CAN WIN AGAIN 
(2009). 
6
  See Christopher D. Zalesky, Considering Changes to CMS’s National Coverage Decision Process:  
Applying Lessons Learned From FDA as a Regulator of Access to Healthcare Technology, 57 FOOD & 
DRUG L. J. 73, 74-75 (2002).   
7
 See generally W. John Thomas, The Vioxx Story: Would it have Ended Differently in the European 
Union?, 32 AM. J. L. & MED. 365 (2006) [hereinafter “Vioxx Story”]; MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT 
DRUG COMPANIES (2004). 
8
 See generally FDA, Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/default.htm (last visited July 31, 
2011); Dep. Health & Human Serv’s, Prescription Drug User Fee Rates for 2012, available at 
http://www.ofr.gov/OFRUpload/OFRData/2011-19332_PI.pdf (last visited July 31, 2011).  See generally 
James L. Zelenay, Jr., The Prescription Drug User Fee Act:  Is a Faster Food and Drug Administration 
Always a Better Food and Drug Administration?, 60 FOOD  & DRUG L. J. 261 (2005).   
9
 As explained by one commentator,  
Once a drug is approved, however, the FDA cannot control how physicians actually prescribe it. 
Physicians can prescribe any drug for any medical condition, even outside of the parameters of the 
label, for a so-called “off-label” use. Therefore, off-label use is the prescription of a 
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changed status of the medical profession and surrounding circumstances since the off-
label norms were established last century.   
 
The article begins with discussion of how the broad discretion to prescribe 
dimensions beyond the clinical research that puts new drugs on pharmacy shelves is the 
product of two historic influences.  The first is a legacy of paternalism and tremendous 
physician autonomy that predates the contemporary commercialization of medicine, and 
the second is regulatory necessity due to the limits of science and innate crudeness of 
pharmaceuticals prior to the genomics revolution (drug development and delivery based 
upon genetic expression).  Although these norms have changed immensely over the last 
several decades, the standard for drug approval remains vested in the past.    
 
Part III addresses the state of drug delivery and development today—a problem of 
over delivery of prescription pharmaceuticals off-label by physicians that is no longer 
supported in our health care system.  The article discusses the history of the authority of 
the AMA over health care and the pharmaceutical marketplace, and how the AMA’s role 
has changed, making its broad discretion to prescribe off label antiquated and 
questionable.  Excessive off-label prescribing detracts from patient care directly and 
through its impact on drug development. 
 
The article concludes that doctor discretion to prescribe off label must be 
modified to improve human health and drug development.  Law-policy proposals are put 
forth to shift drug discovery from doctor offices to the clinical research that puts them on 
pharmacy shelves.  
II. THE BACKSTORY TO CONTEMPORARY OFF-LABEL USE:  AUTONOMY, 
PATERNALISM, AND THE LIMITS OF DRUG DEVELOPMENT 
Expansive physician discretion to prescribe beyond the clinical research that puts new 
drugs on the market is reflective of two historic influences, each of which is addressed 
below.  The first is a legacy of physician paternalism, self-determination, and autonomy 
that predates the contemporary commercialization of medicine.   The second is regulatory 
necessity attributable to the limits of science and innate crudeness of most 
pharmaceuticals prior to the genomics revolution.   
 
A. PHYSICIAN AUTONOMY, SELF-DETERMINATION, AND PATERNALISM 
The medical profession’s response to the television series Marcus Welby, MD, which 
aired from 1968 to 1976 and was the biggest hit in ABC’s history at the time,10 
exemplifies the autonomy, solidarity, and PATERNALISM the AMA enjoyed prior to 
                                                                                                                                                 
pharmaceutical product at a dose and/or for a condition that the FDA has either not reviewed or 
not approved. Off-label uses of drugs are commonplace. For example, most drugs historically 
were tested and approved for use in adults; therefore, physicians who wanted to treat similar 
indications in pediatric patients by definition had to use the drugs off-label. 
Aaron S. Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and Promotion: Balancing Public Health Goals and 
Commercial Speech, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 225 n.114 (2011).       
10
 JOSEPH TUROW, PLAYING DOCTOR: TELEVISION, STORYTELLING, & MEDICAL POWER 143 (2010). 
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changes that began in the 1970s.  The show portrayed Dr. Marcus Welby, the 
consummate family doctor, and his young assistant, Dr. Steven Kiley, played by James 
Brolin.  The two were responsive to PATIENTS as individuals, and they worked to 
humanize medicine against a system of formality and specialization that promoted too 
many uncaring doctors.   
The physician community responded loudly and defensively to the television series.  
They complained “that millions of Americans were becoming resentful of their 
physicians for not living up to the image of the wise and caring physician” and that the 
show was stirring up medical malpractice actions.11  The debate that ensued, set in the 
age of television with heavy national viewership, was the first time that the physician 
establishment engaged in a large-scale public debate over whether patient positive 
fictional depictions of doctors detracted from their status, and it generated extensive 
coverage—including articles in The New York Times Magazine and McCall’s that 
received much attention and fueled the controversy.12  Robert Young, the actor who 
played Dr. Welby, took on a group of family physicians personally at a large national 
convention:  
Robert Young went even so far as to chide physicians publicly for not living up to 
his Welby image.  At one convention of family physicians, for example, a doctor 
said to Young, “You’re getting us all into hot water.  Our patients keep telling us 
we’re not as nice to them as Doctor Welby is to his patients.”  Young didn’t 
mince words.  “Maybe you’re not,” he said.13 
Public and professional reactions to Marcus Welby, MD and the Senate hearings 
and controversy over the pill are two illustrations of how the 1970s was a period of 
transition for the doctor-patient relationship.   Paul Starr, winner of the Pulitzer Prize for 
general nonfiction for the Social Transformation of American Medicine, recognized the 
same in 1984—years prior to proliferation of the managed care movement that he 
predicted,14 and the commercialization and national health care reform eras that have 
followed:15  
When I began work in 1974, it was widely thought that medical schools, planners, 
and administrators were emerging as the chief counterweight to private 
physicians.  Government seemed to be assuming a major, perhaps dominant role 
in the organization of medical care.  Decisions that had formally been private and 
professional were becoming public and political.  Eight years later this is no 
longer clearly the direction of change, but neither is the status quo ante being 
restored.  Private corporations are gaining a more powerful position in American 
medicine; if leading members of the Reagan administration have their way, the 
future may well belong to corporate medicine.  . . . Precisely because of what is 
now taking place, it has become more necessary to understand medicine as a 
                                                 
11
 Id. at 170. 
12
 Id..  Henry Enrich, The Nice Men Cometh, MCCALL’S MAG.23 (May 1972). 
13
 TUROW, PLAYING DOCTOR, supra note 10, at 143. 
14
 See generally Michael J. Malinowski, Capitation, Advances in Medical Technology, and a New Era in 
Medical Ethics, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 331 (1996). 
15
 PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE ix-x (1982). 
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business as well as a cultural phenomenon—and perhaps most important, to 
understand the relation between the two. 
 
The current level of discretion physicians have over drug delivery, the focus of 
this article, is rooted in the medical profession’s autonomous, self-determining past.  An 
element of physician authority is innate: The delivery of patient care is necessarily 
individualized,16 and “The sick are ordinarily not the best judge of their own needs, nor 
are those who are emotionally close to them.”17  However, the U.S. medical profession’s 
story throughout the 20th century is exceptional: “Hardly anywhere have doctors been as 
successful as American physicians in resisting national insurance and maintaining a 
predominantly private and voluntary financing system.”18  The U.S. physician 
community has been at least as effective creating direct returns for itself:19    
 
The profession has been able to turn its authority into social privilege, economic 
power, and political influence.  . . . Until recently, it has exercised dominant 
control over the markets and organizations in medicine that affect its interests. . . . 
At all these levels, from individual relations to the state, the pattern has been one 
of professional sovereignty. 
 
A major factor unique to the U.S. is the political influence of the bond between 
medicine and science—which cannot be underestimated in such a forward-looking nation 
that has and continues to invest so much government and private funding in biomedical 
research.20  Specifically, the medical profession has enjoyed “an especially persuasive 
claim to authority.  Unlike the law and the clergy, it enjoys close bonds with modern 
science, and at least for most of the last century, scientific knowledge has held a 
privileged status in the hierarchy of belief.”21  In fact, the rise of the influence and 
autonomy of the American medical profession correlates with the organization and 
formalization of medical education at the turn of the 20th century—starting with the 
introduction of a four-year graduate program with a clinical teaching hospital component 
by Johns Hopkins University in 1893.22  Harvard University soon followed, other 
universities were inspired to do the same, and states funded programs to increase their 
                                                 
16
 See Michael J. Malinowski & Grant G. Gautreaux, Drug Development—Stuck in a State of Puberty?  
Regulatory Reform of Human Clinical Research to Raise Responsiveness to the Reality of Human 
Variability, __ ST. LOUIS L. REV. __, __ (forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter “Drug Puberty?’].   
17
  STARR, supra note 15, at 5.  
18
 Id. at 6.       
19
 Id. at 5.   
20
 PhRMA, 2010 REPORT  IV  (2011).   Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, supra note 16, at Part 
III.A.; Owen C.B. Hughes, Alan L. Jakimo, & Michael J. Malinowski, United States Regulation of Stem 
Cell Research: Recasting Government’s Role and Questions to be Resolved, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 386-
401 (2009).  See general Malinowski,  Discourse: A Law-Policy Proposal to Promote the Public Nature of 
Science in an Era of Academia-Industry Integration, in BIENNIAL REVIEW OF LAW, SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY: SCIENCE GOVERNANCE, FREEDOM OF RESEARCH, AND PLURALIST DEMOCRACY (2009). 
21
 STARR, supra note 15, at 4. Malinowski, Discourse, supra note 20, at II.A. 
22
 STARR, supra note 15, at 115-116.  Johns Hopkins University took the lead in U.S. medical education by 
opening its medical school in 1893—a 4-year program and requirement that all applications enter with 
college degrees.  Id.  See generally ALAN M. CHESNEY, THE JOHNS HOPKINS HOSPITAL AND THE JOHNS 
HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, VOL. 1, EARLY YEARS, 1867-1893 (1943). 
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populations’ access to quality medical care through education and teaching hospitals.23  A 
population of physicians with graduate medical degree credentials was established, and 
they called for and helped to implement and enforce licensing requirements and other 
standards for the practice of medicine.24  “In the twentieth century, not only did 
physicians become a powerful, prestigious, and wealthy profession, but they succeeded in 
shaping the basic organization and financial structure of American medicine.”25 
 
The medical profession managed to hold control over the practice of medicine and 
block outside interests, government and corporate, from 1900 until 1930.26  Solo private 
practitioners, the majority of physicians during this time, wanted to keep their 
relationships with their patients unimpeded.27  However, the Great Depression launched 
the gradual infusion of outside organizations and entities into the private practice of 
medicine—namely hospitals, government regulators, insurers, pharmaceutical companies, 
and other corporate interests.28  The paradox the American medical profession has faced 
over its status is that its authority has risen in conjunction with therapeutic competence 
enabled through science and technology, but the infusion of science and technology has 
raised the need for capital investment and dependence on organizations such as hospitals, 
pharmaceutical companies and, more recently, commercial health care networks.29  “In 
2009, America’s pharmaceutical research and biotechnology companies continued to 
make the world’s largest investment in pharmaceutical R&D, holding steady with $65.3 
billion spent on R&D, including $45.8 billion by PhRMA members alone.”30   
 
Hospitals were the first organizations to meaningfully crack the medical 
profession’s control over the practice of medicine.  The Johns Hopkins University model 
of combining medical education with clinical hospital practice and joining science 
research and hospital care—precedent for the teaching hospital staple we know today—
lifted the status of hospitals immensely. 31 The resulting science advances affirmed the 
union: hospitals were lifted from sanitariums where the dying were ostracized to 
institutions delivering care and the potential to heal.32  The bridge between the medical 
profession and hospitals, once erected, became national.   Private medical schools, funded 
through philanthropic donations and high tuition, were expensive and offered limited 
access.33  Therefore, as the capabilities of medicine expanded, state land grant 
                                                 
23
 STARR, supra note 15, at 115-116.  See generally MARTIN KAUFMAN, AMERICAN MEDICAL EDUCATION: 
THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1765-1910 (1976) 
24
 See STARR, supra note 15, at 102-112, 123.  See generally State Requirements of Preliminary Education, 
79 JAMA 658 (Aug. 19, 1922). 
25
 STARR, supra note 15, at 7-8.   
26
 Id. at 198-232.  
27
 Id.  
28
 Id. at 270-279. 
29
 Id. at 16. 
30
 PHRMA, 2010 PROFILE iv (2011). 
31
 STARR, supra note 15, at 112-116. 
32
 Id. at 150-152. 
33
 Hughes, Jakimo, & Malinowski, Biomedical Research, supra note 20, at 390-391; Jed Scully, The 
Virtual Professorship: Intellectual Property Ownership of Academic Work in a Digital Era, 35 MCGEORGE 
L. REV. 227, 241-42 (2004). 
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universities financed their own medical schools and teaching hospitals to meet their 
populations’ demand for doctors and health care needs.34 
 
 Insurers were the second category of organizations outside of the physician 
community to establish a meaningful foothold of influence over the practice of medicine.  
The Great Depression limited the ability of people to see and pay for doctor services, 
which raised the medical profession’s responsiveness to insurance.35   However, the 
major occurrence was the labor shortage during World War II.  In 1942, the War Labor 
Board, which prohibited private employers from paying salaries above those offered by 
competitors engaged in the war effort, determined that fringe benefits up to five percent 
of base wages would not be considered inflationary.36  Group hospital plans grew from 
enrollment of seven million subscribers to twenty-six million and, after the war, the 
popularity of employee health plans rose considerably—especially among large 
employers.37   The organized labor and union movement during 1945-1959, promoted 
under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, raised demand for employer-provided 
health insurance coverage, and the Internal Revenue Code accommodated by making the 
cost of health insurance a deduction for employers and a non-taxed benefit for 
employees.38  The limits of health care relative to today made health care affordable, and 
appealing during an era in which employees often were loyal and remained employed by 
                                                 
34
 Hughes, Jakimo, & Malinowski, Biomedical Research, supra note 20, at 390-391. 
35
 STARR, supra note 15, at 232-279. 
36
 Id. at 311.  A testament to the organization and strength of the AMA was the 1940 antitrust conviction 
against it in 1940 for conspiring against an early HMO.  See United States v. Am. Med. Ass'n (AMA), 110 
F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert denied , 110 F.2d 703 (1940).   See generally Sherman Antitrust Act, Act of 
July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2008).  See also Amer. Med. 
Assoc. v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (ruling that the practice 
of medicine is trade or commerce within the meaning of the federal antitrust laws); Amer. Med. Assoc. v. 
Fed Trade Com., 638 F.2d 443(2nd Cir. 1980), aff'd by an equally divided court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982).  The 
courts clarified in the 1970s and 1980s that the medical profession is susceptible to anti-competition laws.  
See e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (eliminating the learned professions 
exemption to the federal antitrust laws); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-57 
(1982) (holding that the maximum fee agreements of a state medical society, as price-fixing agreements, 
are per se unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act).  Decades later but still on the eve of the full sweep of 
managed care and the commercialization of medicine, a federal court found that the AMA violated federal 
antitrust laws by conspiring to eliminate the chiropractic profession.  Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 
352, 360 (7th Cir. 1990).  However, overall, judicial decisions and federal policy have limited the role of 
antitrust laws in the reorganization of the health care sector.  See generally Thomas L. Greaney, Whither 
Antitrust? The Uncertain Future of Competition Law in Health Care, 21 H HEATLH AFFAIRS 185 (2000).  
The medical profession has attempted to limit its exposure to antitrust liability.  See Clark C. Havighurst, 
The Doctors' Trust: Self-Regulation and the Law, 2 HEATLH AFFAIRS 64 (1983); Carl F. Ameringer, 
Federal Antitrust Policy and Physician Discontent: Defining Moments in the Struggle for Congressional 
Relief , 27 J. HEALTH POL. & L. 543 (2002).  See also Sara Rosenbaum, The Impact of United States Law on 
Medicine as a Profession, 289 JAMA 1546, 1552-55 (2003). 
37
 During this time, it was common for employees to work for a single employer for the entire duration of 
their career, which was an added incentive for employers to keep them healthy.  Healthcare Crisis: Who’s 
at Risk? (2000) (PBS video)   
38
 National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (“Wagner Act”), Pub.L. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449, codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. § 151–169).  STARR, supra note 15, at 310.  Employer-provided health insurance continues to 
be a significant health care tax subsidy that often is overlooked in discussion of U.S. health care costs. 
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the same company for their entire careers.39  The employer-based system was reinforced 
during the Cold War as the desirable alternative to socialized medicine.40  The 
organization of private insurance benefited physicians.   They were able to assume a 
gatekeeper role, meaning that insurers and patients placed dependence on them for 
reimbursement decision making, and the existence of insurance added assurance of 
payment.41  During this time, physicians were able to hold onto control over institutions 
and government by organizing professionally.42 
 
 As a complement to the employer-based insurance system, the U.S. government 
enacted the Medicare and Medicaid programs under the Social Security Act in 1965.43  
President Lyndon B. Johnson was able to get the programs approved because their scope 
was limited to patching holes in the system by covering those unable to work—the 
elderly and disabled—with a methodology of moving federal funds through existing 
health care infrastructure.44  Physicians and hospitals welcomed the influx of additional 
insured patients under the programs, and covering the elderly and disabled took pressure 
off of families and had innate popularity during a time of intense social, cultural, 
political, and economic change.45    
 
 The federal government made another major move into the practice of medicine 
after 1962 through the addition of an efficacy requirement for FDA approval of new 
pharmaceuticals.46  The thalidomide controversy was a catalyst for this elevation of the 
approval standard. 47  However, the law was written to be consistent with the established 
assurance that the FDA would not interfere with the practice of medicine—meaning 
physician discretion over clinical use of approved pharmaceuticals would remain 
respected.48  As acknowledged by Professor Evans, “During the twentieth century, FDA 
pursued a policy of not regulating physicians.  This was embodied in the agency’s 
permissive policy on off-label use.”49  
                                                 
39
 Who’s at Risk?, supra note 37.  See Evans, Seven Pillars, infra note 46, at 460. 
40
 President Truman’s proposal for a national plan was rejected, but President Johnson credited him in the 
context of passage of the Medicare and Medicaid plans.  See Who’s at Risk?  
41
 STARR, supra note 15, at 28.   
42
 Id.  
43
 Id. at 369.  Who’s at Risk?, supra note 37. 
44
 Who’s at Risk?, supra note 37. 
45
 ECOCOMIC EVENTS, IDEAS, AND POLICIES: THE 1960S AND AFTER (Eds. George L. Perry & James Tobin, 
2000). 
46
 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 102, 76 Stat. at 781-82 (amendment to 21 U.S.C. 355(d) 
to make lack of substantial evidence of efficacy a ground for denial of drug applications).  The agency did 
not begin requiring all drug manufacturers to submit new drug applications until 1962.  Barbara J. Evans, 
Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic ACT Enters the Genomics 
Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 423 (2010).   
47
 PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL, & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW14 (3rd ed. 
2007); JAMES T. O’REILLY, 1 FOOD & DRUG. ADMIN. § 13:2 (2011). 
48
 See infra notes 49, 95-98 and the accompanying text.  See also Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug 
Puberty?, supra note 16, at n.235 and in the accompanying text (quoting former FDA Commissioner 
Kessler regarding FDAMA).    
49
 See Evans, Pillars, supra note 46, at 509; infra note 98 and accompanying text. The House Report that 
accompanied FDAMA, enacted in 1997,  expressly states that “FDA has no authority to regulate how 
physicians prescribe approved drugs in the context of their medical practice.  Physicians prescribing off-
 11
 
 The AMA had welcomed establishment of the predecessor of the FDA, the Bureau of 
Chemistry, in 1908-1909 to further its cause of capturing control over the flow of medical 
information, including information about pharmaceuticals.50   The higher standard for 
drug approval augmented dependence upon physicians for clinical research and use of 
prescription pharmaceuticals.   Drug makers worked even closer with the medical 
profession to expand their market presence, and that relationship has continued and 
strengthened.51  
 
 As illustrated by the U.S. experience with the pill,52 the 1970s marked the 
beginning of decades of escalading involvement in the practice of medicine by 
institutions outside of the physician community.  In an environment of strong social 
reform movements, from college sit-ins to riots with fatalities, liberal critics of the U.S. 
health care system drove for more state intervention, which in turn augmented the 
involvement of employers, the insurance industry, and the federal government.53  From 
the 1970s to the present, a health care rights movement has questioned the medical 
profession about informed consent,54 other human subject protects,55 patient involvement 
in therapeutic decision making,56 the rights of patients to refuse treatment,57 the right of 
                                                                                                                                                 
label uses of approved drugs is not within the jurisdiction of the FDA.”  H.R.Rep. No. 105-310, at 60 
(1997). 
50
 The roots of today’s FDA date back to the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, though that law addressed 
only the most egregious fake drugs.  See O’REILLY, supra note 47,  at § 3:3 (The Food and Drug 
Administration: A Brief History); STARR, supra note 15, at 131.  The predecessor of today’s FDA, the 
Bureau of Chemistry, was funded in 1909 with a budget of just $685,460.   STARR, supra note 15, at 129.  
The AMA’s efforts between 1900 and 1910 were threefold:        
First, and perhaps most important, muckraking journalists and other Progressives joined 
physicians in a crusade for regulation of patent medicines as part of a more general assault on 
deceptive business practices.  Second, as a result of its growing membership, the AMA finally 
acquired the financial resources to create its own regulatory apparatus and to mount a major effort 
against the nostrum makers [drugs with undisclosed ingredients].  And, third, the drug makers 
were forced to recognize that they depended increasingly on doctors to market their drugs because 
of the public’s increased reliance on professional opinion in decisions about medication. 
Id. In 1905, the  AMA closed its journal to patent medicine advertisements and established a Council on 
Pharmacy and Chemistry to set drug standards and evaluate them.  Id.   
51
 See generally HUTT,  MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 47.  See infra note 112 and accompanying text 
(physician and pharmaceutical interests joined forces to challenge off-label marketing provisions of 
FDAMA). 
52
 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. 
53
 STARR, supra note 15, at 388. 
54
 National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects, established by the National Research Act of 
1974 (Pub. L. 93-348), addressed the controversy and issued the Belmont Report in 1979, available at  
http://science.education.nih.gov/supplements/nih9/bioethics/guide/teacher/Mod5_Belmont.pdf , which 
makes voluntary, informed consent (“respect for persons”) its cornerstone tenet.    
55
 See the Common Rule, 45 C.F.R. Part 46; FDA 21 CFR Parts 50, 56 (FDA human subject protections).  
For more information about the protection of human subjects, visit the Internet site of the Office for Human 
Research Protections (OHRP), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
56
 See generally KATZ, supra note 3; Wolf, supra note 4. 
57
 See Cruzon v. Dir., Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re Quinlan ,70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 
647 (NJ 1976).. 
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patients to see medical records,58 freedom from genetic discrimination,59 DNA 
ownership,60 and other issues, culminating a call for comprehensive national health care 
reform.61    
 
The medical profession also fractured internally, with fissures apparent even in 
the 1960s—especially between academic medicine and private practice, as the voice of 
the former grew in strength and influence.62  The profession and the delivery of care had 
exploded in size from 1950-1970 to become one of the U.S.’s largest industries. 63  
During these two decades, the medical workforce more than tripled in size—from 1.2 to 
3.9 million individuals—and national health care expenditure increased more than 
fivefold, from $12.7 billion (4.5 percent of GNP in 1950) to $71.6 billion (7.3 percent of 
GNP). 64 This growth promoted professional organizations on the state and regional levels 
and specialty-centered professional organizations—all of which made it more difficult for 
the AMA to address controversial issues and for the physician community to speak with a 
single voice.65           
 
 By the 1980s, insurers, employers, and patients became frustrated with rising 
health care costs under a fee-for-service system that invited physicians to perform 
procedures and conduct tests well beyond patients’ actual health care needs, and to 
engage in all out fraud and abuse.66  A managed care movement swept through the 
nation, and the U.S. entered and era of intense commercialization of medicine. 67 In the 
early 1980s, Paul Starr recognized the movement and its future scope:   
 
More recently, the system has begun to slip from [physician] control as power has 
moved away from the organized profession toward complexes of medical schools 
and hospitals, financing and regulatory agencies, health insurance companies 
                                                 
58
 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 (P.L.104-191) [HIPAA]. 
59
 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008 (P.L. 110-233),  
60
 See, e.g., The Ass'n For Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, __ F.3d ___ 
(C.A.Fed. (N.Y.),2011), available at 2011 WL 3211513.  But see generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION (2006). 
61
 See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (to 
be codified as amended in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).  For 
details about the reform, see generally PWC REPORT, supra note 5.   
62
 STARR, supra note 15, at 335; id. at 378 (“As the institutional side of medicine expanded, the medical 
profession itself became more divided, especially between academic medicine and private practice.  The 
cohesiveness of the profession, so vital to its past successes, was beginning, like so many other things in the 
1960s, to come apart.  New interests emerged inside medicine that began to overshadow the private 
practitioners.  And as public dissatisfaction increased with rising costs, these new forces threatened to 
reduce the sovereignty that private doctors had long exercised over medical care.”). 
63
 Id. at 335. 
64
 Id.  
65
 See generally supra note 36 and accompanying text.  
66
 See generally Michael J. Malinowski, Capitation, Advances in Medical Technology, and the Advent of a 
New Era in Medical Ethics, 22 Am. J. L. & MED. 335, 335-360 (1996 symposium), reprinted in TAKING 
SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON CONTROVERSIAL BIOETHICAL ISSUES (Carol Levine ed., 7th ed., 1997).   
67
 Id.  
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prepaid health plans, and health care chains, conglomerates, holding companies 
and other corporations.68   
  
 Solo practitioners have been swallowed up by health care networks and the rest of 
the commercial establishment as predicted, and commercialization has weakened patient 
trust and helped to fuel consumer-driven medicine.69   The AIDS epidemic and the advent 
of information technology in the 1980s-1990s inspired information exchange among 
patients, at times globally, and patient group organization and advocacy, which rages 
on.70  Pervasive direct-to-consumer marketing and internet information on 
pharmaceuticals has inspired patients to demand rather than simply receive prescriptions 
from physicians and, due to the frequency of job and employer insurance carrier changes, 
patients are switching primary care physicians with tremendous frequency.  The world of 
doctor and patient still is too silent, especially with time pressures imposed by the 
commercialization of medicine, but patients are much more vocal, inquisitive, and 
cautious.   
 
The U.S. now has moved into a new era which underscores the need question law 
and policy shaped by norms based upon what was the practice of medicine.  
Governments, federal and state, are taking much more control over the practice of 
medicine—most notably through the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA).71  The Act, though supported by the AMA, has greatly fractured its 
members.72  Though PPACA is being challenged in federal courts and the national debt 
raised questions about financial feasibility, states have and are working on 
comprehensive reforms.  Some states, such as Massachusetts, took action years ago. 
 
B. DRUG TREATMENT:  DISEASE SYMPTOMS, NOT CAUSES 
Human health has improved immensely through the progress of drug development 
since the middle of the 20th century and largely due to pharmaceutical R&D.73  As 
reported by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), “During the 20th 
century, life expectancy at birth among U.S. residents increased by 62%, from 47.3 years 
                                                 
68
 STARR, supra note 15, at 7-8.  Id. at 369. 
69
 See generally Symposium—Patient-Centered, supra note 5. 
70
 See generally Malinowski, Capitation, supra note 66.  
71
 See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (to 
be codified as amended in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); 
PWC REPORT, supra note 5. 
72
 AMA Fractured, Leftists on Top, Private Doctors Say (June 20, 2011) (the AMA House of Delegates 
affirmed support in a vote of 326-165); Robert Lowes, AMA Supports Latest Health Care Reform 
Legislation With Reservations, MEDSCAPE TODAY NEWS (Mar. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/718909  (last viewed Mar. 9, 2011).  Interestingly, the AMA ended 
up generally endorsing the Act though in most of the country there are few too few doctors to absorb the 
more than 40 million insured patients the Act calls for.  This is a major concern in Louisiana with a 
disproportionately large poor and uninsured population and a preexisting shortage of physicians since being 
struck by hurricanes Rita and Katrina.  Presentation by Catherine Kitchen, Director of Policy, Department 
of Health and Hospitals, Louisiana State University Law Center, Health Law Survey (Apr. 2011).  A 
possible solution considered by some states is to grant authorities traditionally held only by licensed M.D.s 
to other health care professionals, thereby diluting the traditional hold of physicians significantly.  Id.  
73
 GRATZER, CURE, supra note 5, at 143.  See generally STARR, supra note 15. 
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in 1900 to 76.8 in 2000, and unprecedented improvements in population health status 
were observed at every stage of life.”74  Vaccines have made a profound impact on the 
prevention of disease:  they now prevent and in some cases control (polio and measles, 
for example) an impressive portfolio of seriously debilitating and life-threatening 
diseases.75  Advances in the treatment of disease have been equally impressive:  “Think 
of antibiotics that stop infection; beta-blockers that reduce heart attach mortality by a 
third; antihypertensives that prevent heart attacks in the first place; and the chemo agents 
that helped Lance Armstrong.”76  These accomplishments have enabled the 
pharmaceutical sector to remain the most profitable one in the U.S. for over half a 
century.77  Moreover, for decades, the tendency of U.S. patients has been to believe in 
prescription medications as the means to overcome their afflictions, and the general 
public assimilates medicine closely with science—especially when grappling with a 
seriously debilitating illness.78    
 
Nevertheless, relative to the elevation of science standards over the last few decades 
through the genomics revolution, overall, 20th Century drug development was a crude 
undertaking.79  Drug sponsors were not even required to obtain an official market 
approval for market access until 1962.80   Congress directed the FDA to require evidence 
of efficacy as well as safety and to engage in risk-benefit decision making.81  Prior to the 
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 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Ten Great Public Health Achievements—United States, 
2001-2010 (2011), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6019a5.htm?s_cid=mm6019a5_w.  For an excellent 
discussion of diminishing returns in drug development, see generally Rising Expectations—And 
Diminishing Returns, in EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE, supra note 60, at 3-25.  
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 See generally Centennial Video, Center for Biotechnology Evaluation and Research (2002) (made 
publicly available; on file with author).  For identification of vaccine preventable diseases, see Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, Vaccines and Preventable Diseases, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vpd-vac/default.htm (last visited June 12, 2011). 
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 GRATZER, CURE, supra note 5, at 143.  See generally  GROOPMAN, supra note 2.   
77
 See generally ANGELL, TRUTH, supra note 7. 
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 GRATZER, CURE, supra note 5, at 143.   
79
 Symposium, Proceedings of “The Genomics Revolution?  Science, Law, and Policy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1-
143 (2005).   As observed by Professor Epstein, “it is hard to return the pharmaceutical industry to its glory 
days of fifty or sixty years ago.  In the interim we have gathered all the low-hanging fruit.”  EPSTEIN, 
OVERDOSE, supra note 60, at 239.  See  Rising Expectations—And Diminishing Returns, in id. at 3-25.  
80
 Evans, Seven Pillars, supra note 46, at 423:  “It was after 1962 that `FDA became responsible for making 
benefit-risk decisions’ about drugs.  Congress directed FDA, for the first time, to require `substantial 
evidence’ of efficacy as well as safety.  FDA interpreted this language to require the familiar three-phase 
clinical trial process through which drugs now pass before FDA approval.”   Drug Amendments of 1962 
(Harris-Kefauver Act), Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended in 21 U.S.C.).  HUTT, 
MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 47, at 434-435.  Vioxx Story, supra note 7, at 365.  See generally See 
generally Jeffrey P. Braff, et al., Patient-Tailored Medicine Part One: The Impact of Race and Genetics on 
Medicine, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. LAW 1 (2008); Jeffrey P. Braff, et al., Patient-Tailored Medicine, Part 
Two: Personalized Medicine and the Legal Landscape, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 7 (2009).   See also 
David Classen, Medication Safety: Moving from Illusion to Reality, 289 JAMA 1154, 1154-56 (2003).  
Harris Meyer, Medicine: Costly Stamp of Approval, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2010, at p. 3, available at 2010 
WLNR 1055167.  Sponsors have been required to demonstrations safety since 1938.  Id.   
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  See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, section 102, 76 Stat. at 781-782.  See also INST. OF 
MED., UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF PHARMACEUTICALS 48 (Leslie Pray rapporteur, 2007); 
Evans, Seven Pillars, supra note 46, at 423. 
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1990s, the medicinal treatment of all human ailments consisted of heavy reliance on a 
mere 1,200 commercial pharmaceuticals derived from 483 drug targets (compounds that 
serve as the basis for medicinal applications).82  “[D]rug discovery essentially was a 
linear process based upon screening and testing of thousands of chemicals and natural 
substances for potential therapeutic activity.  Screening was time consuming and largely 
random because drug targets and drug functions were in most cases unknown.”83   
 
The traditional drug development process developed in the 20th century centers on 
taking away disease symptoms, not understanding and treating disease causes.84  
Compounds are introduced into living organisms for observation to discern their impact, 
potential medicinal utilities are ascertained, new drug candidates are developed and 
purified through the drug approval process to control toxicity and perfect dosage for at 
least one medicinal use.85  The baseline standard for market approval is to outperform a 
placebo (a sugar pill, meaning essentially nothing) on efficacy, perhaps just by a 
percentage point or two, with a showing of tolerable safety in a defined population.86  
Pharmaceuticals approved by the FDA are introduced onto the market with the 
expectation that physicians will experiment further through off-label uses while 
practicing medicine on patients, and thereby identify additional clinical utilities.87   
 
Though drug development has shifted in the direction of genetic precision 
(understanding disease pathways and the importance of genetic expression),88 the 
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 Jürgen Drews, Drug Discovery: A Historical Perspective, 287 SCIENCE 1960, 1960-64 (2000) 
[hereinafter Drews].  Thomas Reiss, Drug Discovery of the Future: The Implications of the Human 
Genome Project, 19 TRENDS BIOTECHNOLOGY 496, 496-99 (Dec. 2001); Michael J. Malinowski, 
Respecting, Rather than Reacting to, Race in Basic Biomedical Research: A Response to Professors 
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targets was the primary bottleneck of the drug discovery process.” Braff, Patient-Tailored One, supra note 
80, at 11.  
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Dev., Backgrounder: How New Drugs Move Through the Development and Approval Process (Nov. 2001), 
available at csdd.tufts.edu/NewsEvents/RecentNews.asp?newsid=4; and Jim Gilbert, Preston Henske & 
Ashish Singh, Rebuilding Big Pharma's Business Model, 21 BUS. & MED. REP.  1 (Nov. 2003), available at 
www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/cms/Marketing/rebuilding_big_pharma.pdf. 
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 Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, supra note 16, at  III.A. 
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 See HUTT,  MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 47, at 467-834. 
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 21 C.F.R. pts 301-369.  See also Vioxx Story, supra note 7, at 365. 
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 See Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F.Supp.2d 51, 56 (D.D.C.1998) vacated in part on other 
grounds, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C.Cir.2000) (observing that “off-label use of FDA-approved drugs by physicians 
is an established aspect of the modern practice of medicine”); Malinowski & Gautreux, Drug Puberty?, 
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 See generally infra Part III.B; PERSONALIZED MEDICINE COALITION, THE CASE FOR PERSONALIZED 
MEDICINE 1, 4 (Nov. 2006), available at 
www.personalizedmedicinecoalition.org/communications/TheCaseforPersonalizedMedicine_ 11_13.pdf 
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regulatory standard for market approval of a drug candidate in the U.S. remains largely 
the same:  elimination of symptoms, even if just marginally more effectively than a 
placebo, coupled with a showing that adverse events and other safety issues across the 
target disease population are tolerable given the benefits.89  Industry sponsors hold broad 
discretion to tailor clinical research and to apply (or not) for approval of specific uses in 
applications for market access, which provides an incentive to limit the scope of 
applications for market access, get approval, and then exploit physician off label use 
through sponsorship of research and conferences and the distribution of medical journal 
publications. 90    
 
III. TODAY’S DRUG DELIVERY OVERDOSE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT  
Life science and medicine have changed fundamentally since the days of Marcus 
Welby, M.D.91  The traditional approach to drug development—heavy reliance on 
physician-patient use, on and off-label, to develop meaningful understanding of 
pharmaceuticals—must be modified to address the realities of contemporary health care 
and biopharmaceutical R&D.   As addressed below, from the perspectives of both 
delivery of care and drug development, the traditional approach simply is not working, 
and adhering to it is imposing an opportunity cost to human health as well as an 
economic cost to the biopharmaceutical sectors.        
 
A.   DRUG DELIVERY OVERDOSE 
The medical profession supported the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 and 
expansion of federal regulation of prescription pharmaceuticals throughout much of the 
20th Century.92  The Drug Act was consistent with the AMA’s campaign against the sale 
                                                                                                                                                 
(last visited May 6, 2011); Braff, Patient-Tailored One, supra note 80, at 16-17.  See also Evans, Seven 
Pillars, supra note 46, at  Part IV.A (anticipated clinical care uptake of genetic screens).   
89
 See 21 C.F.R. pts 301-369; A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION 126 
(Kenneth R. Piña & Wayne L. Pines eds., 2d ed. 2002); Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, supra 
note 16, at 54-55 and in the accompanying text.  Cf. John, Vioxx; supra note 54;  Braff, Patient-Tailored 
One, supra note 80, at 9 (“Nonetheless, not until the second half of the twentieth century has much 
attention been paid to drug safety and, even then, adverse drug reactions were considered part of the 
practice of medicine.”); David Classen, Medication Safety: Moving from Illusion to Reality, 289 JAMA 
1154, 1154-56 (2003).  
90
 Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 333 (C.A.D.C. 2000).  Off-label use of 
pharmaceuticals is “generally accepted” in the medical community and commonly practiced.  See 
Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F.Supp.2d 51, 56 (D.D.C.1998) vacated in part on other 
grounds, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C.Cir.2000) (observing that “off-label use of FDA-approved drugs by physicians 
is an established aspect of the modern practice of medicine”); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 
531 U.S. 341, 349, 121 S.Ct. 1012, 1018, 148 L.Ed.2d 854 (2001). 
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 TUROW, PLAYING DOCTOR, supra note 10, at 143. 
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 STARR, supra note 15, at 128-134.  The Biologics Control Act of 1902 arguably is the baseline for what 
has become the regulation of contemporary biopharmaceuticals and established the predecessor for the 
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) within the FDA. CBER, Centennial, supra note 75 
(video documentary released by CBER).  The 1901 deaths of 13 children from tetanus attributable to 
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the National Institutes of Health, available at  http://history.nih.gov/exhibits/history/docs/page_03.html 
(last visited June 27, 2011).  For the expansion of regulatory authority over pharmaceuticals, see infra notes 
46-47 and accompanying text. 
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of snake oils (fabricated medicines, often dangerous to human health), and creation of a 
market gatekeeper for prescription medicines gave the AMA much more control over the 
flow of medical information and created dependence on the physician community for 
clinical research and patient use of pharmaceuticals.93  Enforcement was expanded during 
the 1960s to instill an application and approval process for all new drugs as a prerequisite 
for market access and to impose an efficacy standard.94     
Although the AMA welcomed a government gate keeper for the pharmaceutical 
market, it did so with the condition that the FDA would not interfere with the practice of 
medicine—meaning physician discretion over clinical use of approved pharmaceuticals 
would remain respected.95  This caveat has been codified in law and reinforced over 
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 In 1905, the AMA closed its Journal to advertisements for medicines under patent protection and 
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STARR, supra note 15, 129. 
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time,96 including in conjunction with enactment of the Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 2007.97  As explained by Professor Evans,98 
During the twentieth century, FDA pursued a policy of not regulating physicians.  
This was embodied in the agency’s permissive policy on off-label use.  This 
policy let physicians choose to disregard instructions and warnings in drug 
labeling.  FDA took the position that “labeling is not intended either to preclude 
the physician from using his best judgment in the interest of his patient, or to 
impose liability if he does not follow the package insert.”  This policy made a 
certain amount of sense under the 1962 regulatory paradigm, which focused 
FDA’s attention on average safety and efficacy.  Unable to provide meaningful 
guidance about individual safety and efficacy, FDA left this determination to 
physicians.    
The legacy of physician discretion over the use of pharmaceuticals continues.  
Once drugs reach the market, the medical community may exercise its broad discretion to 
use them off-label, and it does so aggressively.99  Prescription uses without supportive 
clinical data are commonplace in all areas of medicine, but even more frequent in some 
medical areas such as oncology and pediatrics.100  Pediatric data is insufficient, at times 
                                                 
96
 See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2000) (medical device regulation); 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000) (“Nothing in 
[Medicare] shall be construed to authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or 
control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided.”); Legal Status 
of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs: Prescribing Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug 
Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503, 16,504 (Aug. 15, 1972) (to be codified at 21 CFR pt. 130) (“[I]t is 
clear that Congress did not intend the [FDA] to regulate or interfere with the practice of medicine ....”); 
FTC v. Simeon Mgmt. Corp., 391 F. Supp. 697, 706-07 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, 532 F.2d 708, 717 (9th Cir. 
1976).  See also Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, supra note 16, at 108, 235, and in the 
accompanying text;  Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & 
ETHICS 717, 720, 731-2 (2005); Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between 
Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 397-98 (2002) (off label use is particularly 
aggressive in some medical specialties, including oncology specialties).   
97
 The House Report that accompanied FDAMA expressly states that “FDA has no authority to regulate 
how physicians prescribe approved drugs in the context of their medical practice.  Physicians prescribing 
off-label uses of approved drugs is not within the jurisdiction of the FDA.”  H.R.Rep. No. 105-310, at 60 
(1997).As for legal challenges, in 2000 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia determined that 
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (“FDAMA”) provisions addressing manufacturer 
promotion of off-label use imposed an undue burden on commercial free speech in violation of the First 
Amendment.  See generally Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (C.A.D.C. 2000).  At 
issue in the case were the FDA's and Congress' attempts to regulate two promotional strategies: 
manufacturer dissemination to physicians of independent medical and scientific publications concerning the 
off-label uses of their products (referred to as “enduring materials”), and manufacturer support for 
Continuing Medical Education (CME) programs for doctors that focus on off-label uses.  See generally id. 
98
 Evans, Seven Pillars, supra note 46, at 509 (internal citations omitted). 
99
 Rodwin, supra note 95, at 807 (“Because of their medical knowledge, physicians are authorized to 
prescribe drugs even for uses unapproved by the FDA”). 
100
  See generally id.  See also Eisenberg, supra note 96, at 731.   “Off-label prescribing is very common in 
all areas of medicine.  It is not uncommon for a drug to be prescribed more often off-label than on-label . . . 
.”   Daniel B. Klein & Alexander Tabarrok, Do Off-label Drug Practices Argue Against FDA Efficacy 
Requirements? A Critical Analysis of Physicians' Argumentation for Initial Efficacy, 67 AM. J. ECON. & 
SOC. 743 (2008) (internal citations omitted; page numbers not available online).  According to these 
 19
wholly lacking, for two-thirds of prescription drugs.101  Even with extensive off-label use, 
children often are the last to receive innovative new drugs due to a dearth of clinical 
data.102  The FDA attempted to force pediatric studies, but it was sued successfully by a 
collaboration between the physician community and pharmaceutical sector.103        
 Physician choice to use prescription medications to treat any health ailment 
regardless of the data submitted to the FDA for market approval was functional and to 
some extent necessary during much of the last century.104  Throughout most of that time, 
the entire prescription drug arsenal to treat all human illness consisted of several hundred 
pharmaceuticals developed from a few hundred compounds,105 and the limit of science 
capabilities restricted the scope of clinical research that was practicable.106   Health care 
needs coupled with limited science understanding invited physician ingenuity in treating 
patients.  The FDA itself was undeveloped in function and funded miserly given its 
responsibilities after the new drug application and efficacy standard requirements were 
introduced in the 1960s.107  Also, there was healthy distance between the medical 
profession and pharmaceutical sector through the medical profession’s independence and 
influence, patient deference to physician decision making, and the limited mass media 
reach of the drug industry.  Pharmaceutical marketing was contained by the FDA as the 
agency evolved and exercised more authority in the 1970s, and prior to the first 
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) in 1992 and the Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act in 1997 (FDAMA).108  PDUFA established a user fee system in which 
industry negotiated with Congress and the FDA and agreed to pay user fees for 
application review.  FDAMA, negotiated in conjunction with PDUFA renewal, increased 
FDA transparency and accountability and expanded the FDA’s mission to work with 
industry to increase efficiency and bring new drugs to market quicker—especially 
innovative new drugs for untreated or insufficiently treated life-threatening or seriously 
                                                                                                                                                 
authors, “Most cancer and AIDS patients are given drugs that are not FDA certified for the prescribed use. 
In a large number of fields, a majority of patients are prescribed at least one drug off-label.”  Id. 
101
 “Indeed, 80 percent to 90 percent of pediatric patient regimens involve at least one off-label 
prescription.”   Klein &  Tabarrok, Off-label, supra note 100, at 743.  See also Kristal M. Wicks, Exhausted 
or Unlicensed: Can Field-of-Use Restrictions in Biotech License Agreements Still Prevent Off-Label Use 
Promotion After Quanta Computer?, 9 U. N.H. L. REV. 157, 163 (2010); Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug 
Puberty?, supra note 16, at 236-251 and the accompanying text (addressing pediatric exclusivity). 
102
 See 63 Fed.Reg. at 66,632.  See Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, supra note 16, at 232. 
103
 Association of American Physicians and Surgeons Inc., et al, v. United States Food and Drug 
Administration, 226 F.Supp.2d 204 (Oct. 17, 2002), 2002 WL 31323411 (D.D.C.); Hearings on Better 
Pharmaceuticals for Children Act at 4 (2002) (statement of Janet Heinrich, Director, Health Care-Public 
Health Issues).  See Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, at 241-241.  Congress enacted legislation to  
create the means for the FDA to get desired pediatric studies done directly, regardless of industry support.  
See infra notes 212-218 and accompanying text. 
104
 Cf. Rising Expectations—And Diminishing Returns, in EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE, supra note 60, at 3-25. 
105
 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.  The inventory of prescription pharmaceuticals used routinely 
did not reach 1,200 until the 1980s.  The number of overall approvals is much higher, however.  See Evans, 
Seven Pillars, supra note 46, at 428-429. 
106
 STARR, supra note 15, at 135. 
107
 The FDA did not even require new drug applications until 1962, following by a showing of efficacy.  
See supra notes 46, 80, 99 and the accompanying text.   
108
 See supra notes 1-2 and the accompanying text. 
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life-debilitating conditions.109  During the 1990s, industry joined forces with patient 
groups to support increases in government (NIH) funding of basic research and to 
demand that the FDA work faster to bring new drugs to market.110                    
The medical profession has lost much of its independence and most of its 20th 
century control over the flow of pharmaceutical information. 111  Rather than working 
with the government to filter pharmaceutical information, in recent years, the medical 
profession and biopharmaceutical sectors have joined forces to check the FDA’s 
authority over the market dissemination of information about new drugs.  Most notable is 
the Washington Legal Foundation litigation, which resulted in a federal appellate court 
ruling that the FDAMA provision to place quality controls on drug maker dissemination 
of journal articles promoting off-label use violated commercial free speech and was 
unconstitutional. 112   Drug manufacturers, though prohibited from directly marketing off-
label uses of their prescription drugs, now are able to fund journals and sponsor research 
to generate favorable publications, and to disseminate resulting articles to doctors to 
encourage unapproved uses of their drugs.113  The biopharmaceutical sectors have 
managed to position themselves well through armies of sales representatives and 
aggressive sales tactics, 114 direct-to-consumer marketing in an age of consumer-driven 
                                                 
109
 James L. Zelenay, The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Is a Faster Food and Drug Administration 
Always a Better Food and Drug Administration?, 60 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 261, 295  (2005) (“PDUFA II [, 
enacted in conjunction with FDAMA,] shifted the agency's focus from one based solely on protecting the 
public from unsafe and ineffective products, possibly at the cost of expediency, to one that must balance 
this interest in safety with an interest in providing patients with speedy access to new drugs.”); Christopher 
D. Zalesky, Considering Changes to CMS's National Coverage Decision Process: Applying Lessons 
Learned From FDA as a Regulator of Access to Healthcare Technology, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 73, 86 
(2002).   
110
 This observation is drawn from the author’s experience as Manager, Massachusetts Biotechnology 
Counsel in 1997-1998 and practice of law in the field of biotechnology throughout most of the 1990s. 
111
 The AMA closed its own journal to advertisements for medicines under patent protection and invited the 
FDA as a mechanism for control.  STARR, supra note 15, at 129. 
112
 Washington Legal Foundation v. Henne y, 202 F.3d 331, 333 (C.A.D.C. 2000).  Off-label use of 
pharmaceuticals is “generally accepted” in the medical community and commonly practiced.  See 
Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F.Supp.2d 51, 56 (D.D.C.1998) vacated in part on other 
grounds, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C.Cir.2000) (observing that “off-label use of FDA-approved drugs by physicians 
is an established aspect of the modern practice of medicine”); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 
531 U.S. 341, 349, 121 S.Ct. 1012, 1018, 148 L.Ed.2d 854 (2001).   
113
 See generally See generally  INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: ACTION STEPS 
FOR CONGRESS (2006) [hereinafter “IOM Report”].  Kristal M. Wicks, Exhausted or Unlicensed: Can 
Field-of-Use Restrictions in Biotech License Agreements Still Prevent Off-Label Use Promotion After 
Quanta Computer?, 9 U. N.H. L. REV. 157, 164 (2010).   
114
 Www.bio.org.  Www.phrma.org.  See generally Rodwin, Drug Advertising, supra  note 95, at 807; 
Eisenberg, New Uses, supra note 96.  See also , GRATZER, supra note 5, at 145 (“This book is not an 
unqualified defense of pharmaceutical companies.  I am certainly ambivalent about several industry 
practices: the drug dinners that mix education with advertising and wine, the highly paid drug reps, the 
skewed studies.  I meet with drug reps periodically—I need the free samples to help my patients—and I 
find the process uncomfortable.”).  Id. at 145-146 (criticism of the rebirth of Prilosec as a new drug, 
Nexium, to overcome the end of Prilosec patent protection).  The experience of Dr. Jerome Groopman is 
that, “Today, medicine is not separate from money.  How much does intense marketing by pharmaceutical 
companies actually influence either conscious or subliminal decision-making?  Very few doctors, I believe, 
prostitute themselves for profit, but all of us are susceptible to the subtle and not so subtle efforts of the 
pharmaceutical industry to sculpt our thinking.”  GROOPMAN, THINK, supra note 2, at 9. 
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medicine,115 sponsorship of continuing medical education programs, collaboration under 
trade organizations such as the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
and the Biotechnology Industry Organization, and direct lobbying.  The complexities of 
contemporary life science have raised the medical community’s dependence on the drug 
industry for information, especially under time constraints associated with the 
commercialization of medicine.116  U.S. patients have faith in new treatments, including 
experimental ones.117   
The organization and expansion of patient groups, encouraged under the U.S. 
pluralistic legal system and empowered 1990s information technology progress, have 
become another force promoting new drug approvals and an ally of the 
biopharmaceutical sectors in new drug development.118  The very mission of the FDA 
was changed under FDAMA to work with industry to increase its efficiency, and the 
agency has two decades of experience collecting user fees from drug sponsors to pay the 
salaries of those who review their applications.119  While industry and the FDA have 
solidified relations, drug sponsors have reduced their dependence on the American 
medical profession for its clinical research by turning to contract research organizations 
(“CROs”), private companies with global reach in the business of conducting clinical 
research, and moving much of it abroad.120  The FDA also has made ongoing clinical 
                                                 
115
 See generally Symposium—Patient-Centered, supra note 5.  See also Wolf, supra note 4, at 496 (“The 
last few decades have seen tremendous agreement that decision-making should be a shared process but that 
patient preferences should rule.  And that agreement prevails even when the predicted consequence of 
honoring the patient’s wish is her death.”); id. at 499 (“Physicians in practice are less and less surprised to 
see patients arrive for an office visit having researched their illness and toting internet printouts.”). 
116
 As explained by Dr. Janet Woodcock, Director of the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, 
drug developers have been hesitant to share genetic tests used to develop drugs with the FDA and 
physicians have been hesitant to uptake the tests made available.  Janet Woodcock, FDA Policy on 
Pharmacogenomic Data in Drug Development, 66 LA LAW REV. 91, 93 (2005) (special symposium 
proceedings issue, Genomics Revolution?).  See generally Jeffrey L. Moe, Commercialization 
Considerations for Individualized Diagnostic and Drug Therapies Resulting from Pharmacogenomics, 66 
LA LAW REV. 103-116 (2005) (addressing physician resistance to uptake and other impediments to clinical 
use of genetic screens associated with pharmaceuticals).   Even when pharmacogenomics (drug 
development based upon genetic variations that can promote individualized medicine) data makes it onto 
drug labels, the underlying sponsor data released is limited, and the medical community often lacks the 
knowledge to make efficient use of it.  Kelly C. Lee, Joseph D. Ma, & Grace M. Kuo. Pharmacogenomics: 
Bridging the Gap Between Science and Practice. 50 J AM PHARM ASSOC.e1-e17 ( 2010).                  
117
 See generally  IOM REPORT, supra note 113 (suggesting black triangle indicators for new drug approvals 
to flag the lack of market history).  See also Wylie Burke & Bruce M. Psaty, Personalized Medicine in the 
Era of Genomics, 298 JAMA 1682, 1682-84 (2007). 
118
 Previous scholarship---rise of patient groups from AZT/AIDS.  Ironically, often at odds over 
pricing/reimbursement.  See David E. Winickoff,, Governing Population Genomics: Law, Bioethics, and 
Biopolitics in Three Case Studies,  43 JURIMETRICS: J. L., SCI. & TECH. 222-223 (2003).    
119
 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA), Pub.L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 
(1997).  See 21 U.S.C. § 355a (1997) (amended 2002); PDUFA IV, 72 FED. REG. 1743 (2007) (public 
comments solicited for PDUFA IV, 2008-2012).  See supra note 8 and accompanying text.   
120
 Miho Nagano, Big Pharma Looks for a Fix, INV. BUS. DAILY, Sept. 29, 2008 (pg. nos. unavailable 
online).  CROs are commercial service providers that meet both basic and clinical research needs, and the 
business is burgeoning.  See id.  Unfortunately, guidance and enforceable law-policy to protect human 
subjects has not been introduced in sync with this trend:  "The globalization of medical research is, in 
effect, quickly outpacing the development of internationally accepted ethical guidelines for the conduct of 
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research transparent to the general public through www.clinicaltrials.gov, further 
reducing dependence on the medical community. 
 
B. DRUG UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
In spite of tremendous annual increases in drug funding by industry and 
government over the last few decades,121 major advances in science including completion 
of a map of the human genome,122 and modernization of the Food and Drug 
Administration in 1997,123 the U.S. drug review and approval system with heavy 
dependence on physician off-label use is no longer working.124  “[T]here is substantial 
proof that the current method of creating medicines for the general public is problematic 
                                                                                                                                                 
research. For many medical researchers working in resource-poor countries, ethical decision-making is like 
sailing in the days before modern navigation; one is never quite sure where one is, or in what direction one 
is headed."  Daniel W. Fitzgerald & Angela Wasunna, Away from Exploitation and Towards Engagement: 
An Ethical Compass for Medical Researchers Working in Resource-Poor Countries, 33 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 559, 559 (2005).  See also Stephens, Where Profits and Lives Hang in Balance: Finding an 
Abundance of Subjects and Lack of Oversight Abroad, Big Drug Companies Test Offshore to Speed 
Products to Market, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2000, at A1.  See generally Michael J. Malinowski, Ethics in a 
Global Pharmaceutical Environment, 5 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 57, 70-71 (2006); Jennifer M. Gold & 
David M. Studdert, Clinical Trials Registries: A Reform that is Past Due, 33 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 811 
(2005) (proposing establishment of a conclusive registry for clinical trials conducted abroad); Nagano, 
supra note 120 (“A sign of the trend: In August, Princeton, N.J.-based Covance CVD, the largest U.S. 
CRO, struck a deal with Eli Lilly to buy Lilly's R&D labs in Indiana for $50 million. The deal will transfer 
260 Lilly employees to Covance. Lilly also guaranteed Covance a 10-year business contract worth $1.6 
billion.”). 
121
 The biopharmaceutical sectors spend tens of billions of dollars on research annually.  See supra note 30 
and accompanying text;  PHRMA, supra note 30, at iv  See generally Seton Hall, The Center for Health & 
Pharmaceutical Law & Policy, White Paper, Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & 
Enrollment: A Call for Increased Oversight 5 (Nov. 2009). 
122
 See generally National Human Genome Research Institute, National Institutes of Health, & Department 
of Energy, International Consortium Completes Human Genome Project: All Goals Achieved; New Vision 
for Genome Research Unveiled, Apr. 14, 2003, available at genome.gov. (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).  “Ten 
years after President Bill Clinton announced that the first draft of the human genome was complete, 
medicine has yet to see any large part of the promised benefits.”  Nicholas Wade, A Decade Later, Gene 
Map Yields Few New Cures, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2010, at 1, 22. The transition could take many years—
decades according to some commentators. See generally Braff, supra note 80.                 
123
 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
124
 “Unfortunately, present reality is that drug development lingers between the scientifically crude, yet 
enormously profitable pharmaceutical past and the biopharmaceutical present and future.” Malinowski & 
Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, supra note 16, at __ (proposing that the FDA adopt single subject research 
methodology to accompany its reliance on group design in human clinical research).  See also Michael J. 
Malinowski & Grant G. Gautreaux, All that is Gold Does Not Glitter in Human Clinical Research: A Law-
Policy Proposal to Brighten the Global “Gold Standard” for Drug Research and Development, CORNELL 
J. INT’L LAW (forthcoming) (proposing international adoption of SSRD in human clinical research and 
proposing a law-policy methodology to turn the “gold standard” of group design for clinical research into 
platinum through SSRD).  For arguments in favor of changing FDA law-policy on other grounds, see 
generally ANGELL, supra note 7. 
98; Peter Jennings, Bitter Medicine: Pills Profit, and the Public Health (2002) (ABC News); FDA, 
INNOVATION OR STAGNATION: CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY ON THE CRITICAL PATH TO NEW MEDICAL 
PRODUCTS (March 2004), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/CriticalPathInitiative/CriticalPathOpportunitiesReports
/ucm077262.htm. 
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and could prevent effective treatments from reaching the marketplace . . .”125  As 
observed by Dr. Francis Collins, head of the National Institutes of health, “[T]he drug 
industry’s research productivity has been declining for 15 years, `and it certainly doesn’t 
show any signs of turning upward’…”126  The industry produced just eighteen new drugs 
in 2007, the lowest number in a quarter of century, twenty-four in 2008, and twenty-six in 
2009.127  Pfizer Inc., the world’s largest research-based pharmaceutical company, did not 
produce a single new drug approval in 2010.128  In comparison, new drug approvals 
peaked in 1996 when the FDA approved fifty-three.129   
 
Moreover, several drugs the FDA has put on the market over the last decade have 
raised questions about the Agency’s judgment, effectiveness, and reliability to the point 
of having aroused Congressional action,130 generated scathing reports from the 
Government Accountability Office and the Institute of Medicine,131 and inspired class 
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 Braff, Patient-Tailored One, supra note 80, at 5; Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, supra note 
16, at __ (forthcoming). 
126
 Dr. Francis S. Collins, Director of the National Institutes of Health, as quoted in a New York Times 
story on the federal government’s decision to launch a billion-dollar drug development center to help 
industry create new pharmaceuticals.  Harris, New Center, supra note 80, at A1. 
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 Steven Burrill, Steven Burrill Predicts Biotechnology’s Fortunes for First-Half 2009, PHARMA 
MARKETLETTER, Jan. 19, 2009 (pg. nos. unavailable online), 2009 WLNR 7402398 (Westlaw).  The FDA 
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Pharma Looks for a Fix, INV. BUS. DAILY, Sept. 29, 2008 (pg. nos. unavailable online) (stating 17 
approvals in 2007). Jenna Greene, Has Obama Redirected the Regulatory System?  After One Year, Some 
Agencies Can’t Write Rules Fast Enough, While Others Sit and Wait, NAT’L L. J., Jan. 18, 2010, at p. 11. 
The FDA approved twenty-four innovative new drugs in 2008 and eighteen in 2007.  See Jared A. Favole, 
FDA Approved More Drugs in 2008,  WALL. ST. J., Jan. 2, 2009, at A9.   
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 Pfizer Inc., Official Site, http://www.pfizer.com/about/?gclid=CMGcjqWm36UCFQGe7Qod4WH9VA 
(last visited Aug. 1, 2011). 
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 Robert Coopman, Drug Makers in Midst of Productivity Quandry, CHAIN DRUG REV., Jan. 18, 2010, p. 
42, 2010 WLNR 2155205. 
130
 The culmination of Congressional concern is the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 
2007 (FDAAA), Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (Sept. 27, 2007) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 21 U.S.C.).  
131
 See generally UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL 
REQUESTERS, DRUG SAFETY: IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN FDA’S POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND 
OVERSIGHT PROCESS (2006) [hereinafter “GAO  FDA REPORT”]; IOM REPORT, supra note 113.  Both the 
GAO and IOM have criticized the FDA’s performance regulating new drugs in the marketplace and 
emphasized the need to make the clinical research data submitted for market approval transparent to the 
public. See generally GAO REPORT, supra; IOM REPORT, supra.  Neither Congress nor the FDA have 
addressed the possibility that the drop-off in innovative new drug approvals and poor performance of many 
on the market are an indication that the integrity of the entire forthcoming generation of biopharmaceuticals 
has been jeopardized by law and policy that comprehensively integrated academia and industry without 
shoring up the public nature of science.  See Discourse, supra note 20, at 2-24.  During the span of the 
career of a single academic researcher, norms have shifted from independence from industry, collegiality, 
disclosure and sharing of materials and information, quick and unfettered publication, and broad 
dissemination of information that invited meaningful scrutiny and rigorous peer review to strong 
technology transfer administration within academic research institutions, reward based upon 
commercialization, no communication without executed confidentiality and disclosure agreements and 
provisional patent applications, no publication without sponsor preapproval, and no sharing of materials 
without executed material transfer agreements.   See generally id. 
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action litigation.132  The public has lost confidence in the FDA, and for good reason.133  
The FDA withdrew ten drugs for safety concerns between 2000 and March 2006, 134 and 
“It has been estimated that as many as half of all new drugs have at least one serious 
adverse effect that is unknown at the time of drug approval.”135  Vioxx is probably the 
agency’s most notorious mistake—“a ‘scarlet letter’ the FDA is likely to wear for years 
to come.”136  In the fall of 2010, the FDA itself “concluded that in some cases two types 
of drugs that were supposed to be preventing serious medical problems were, in fact, 
causing them.”137  One was Avandia, which was prescribed heavily to treat type-2 
diabetes.  An association was made between Avandia and an increased risk of heart 
attacks and strokes—a serious problem for the target patient group given that two-thirds 
of diabetics die of heart problems.138  The second was bisphosphonates—an active agent 
in the prescription drugs Fosamax, Actonel and Boniva, which were prescribed 
frequently to prevent fractures common in people with osteoporosis.     Bisphosphonates, 
prescribed to prevent bone loss, was determined to actually cause thigh bone fractures 
and jawbone degeneration.139  In addition, in 2009 it was determined that Acutane, on the 
market since 1982, subjected an entire generation of teenagers who were prescribed the 
drug to treat severe acne to increased risks for inflammatory bowel disease, ulcerative 
colitis, Crohn’s disease, other gastrointestinal disorders, liver damage, birth defects, and 
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 See generally Thomas, Vioxx Story, supra note 7. 
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 “Public confidence in FDA fell from 80% in the 1970s to 61% in 2000; 56% in 2004; and 36% in 2006.” 
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 Thomas, Vioxx Story, supra note 7, at 365; Nagano, supra note 120 (pg. nos. unavailable online) (the 
Vioxx controversy has inspired drug companies to undertake more toxicology studies). 
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 Gina Kolata, When Drug Problems Cause Problems They Are Supposed to Prevent, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
17, 2010, p. 17.    
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highly critical of both GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and the FDA.  See Committee on Finance, United States 
Senate, Staff Report on Glaxosmithkline and the Daibetes Drug Avandia (Jan. 2010).  The drug was 
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estimates.  Id.  “GSK researchers identified a link to serious heart disease in 2003, 2005, and 2006, the 
FDA issued a warning in 2007, two of the FDA’s top officials in the Office of Surveillance and 
Epidemiology recommended a full market recall, and internal FDA reports indicated that switching 
Avandia patients to an alternative drug could prevent about 500 heart attacks and 300 cases of heart failure 
each month.”  Id. The Senate reported that executives at Glaxo “attempted to intimidate independent 
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 Kolata, Drug Problems, supra note 137, at 17. 
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suicidal thoughts.  Roche, the manufacturer, pulled Acutane from the market on June 29, 
2009.140   
 
Many commercial drug developers and their supporters attribute the drop-off in 
new drug approvals to over-regulation by the FDA and other government entities.141  
Others attribute the fall to an industry that is clinging to the low science and regulatory 
standards of the past, making bad and expensive decisions based upon these low 
standards,142 stretching the commercial lives of pharmaceuticals through manipulation of 
the patent system, and contriving “me too” drugs rather engaging in genuine 
innovation.143  The Vioxx controversy did force the agency to raise its level of scrutiny, 
including more toxicology studies and now measures to comply with the FDAAA.144 
 
A factor contributing to the drug industry’s underperformance is that, subsequent 
to enactment of FDAMA in 1997 (again, drug approvals peaked in 1996), the FDA has 
been relying even more on market experience for meaningful clinical understanding of 
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Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, pharmaceutical companies spend almost $900 
million to bring a drug to market.  Thirty years ago, the cost was a small fraction, $138 million 
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DAVID GRATZER, THE CURE, supra note 5, at 152.   
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 See generally Thomas, Vioxx Story, supra note 7.  See also FDAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). See infra notes 144, 165-167, 170, 188-200 and 
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pharmaceuticals and off-label physician use for drug discovery.  Specifically, under 
FDAMA, the FDA lowered its approval standard by switching its presumption in favor of 
safety—erring on the side of safety since—to one that favors approval on the condition of 
Phase IV studies under section 506B of FDAMA, often referred to as 506B studies. 145  
The intention is good and consistent with the efficiency element of the FDA’s mission 
infused by FDAMA: make new drugs available to patients who need them as quickly as 
possible.146  The problem is that the FDA has not been enforcing these post-market study 
conditions.147  Once on the market, the new drug not fully understood becomes an off-
label prescription option.   
 
Folding pharmaceuticals into the context of the overall practice of medicine raises 
more issues.  Medicine remains much more art than science: 
 
Even today, with a high-tech health-care system that costs the nation $2 trillion a 
year, there is little or no evidence that many widely used treatments and procedures 
actually work better than various cheaper alternatives.  . . .  And while there has been 
progress in recent years, most of these physicians say the portion of medicine that has 
been proven effective is still outrageously low—in the range of 20% to 25%.148 
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Inviting the practicing physician community to experiment with new pharmaceuticals off-
label and, especially in the case of pharmaceuticals that reach the market under 506B, to 
work out the clinical safety and efficacy of drugs over time, patient-by-patient , “exposes 
patients to potentially harmful drug interactions and delays potentially effective or the 
‘right’ treatment.”149  At most, only one-third of prescription medicines act as expected 
when prescribed to patients.150  Adverse drug reactions cause more than 100,000 deaths 
and more than two million hospitalizations annually in the US—meaning that more 
people in the U.S. die from legal use of prescription medications than from automobile 
accidents.151   
 
The crude science past of just taking away symptoms is fading into the history of 
drug development.  Genomics (genetic expression) already has a strong presence in the 
drug development pipeline; scientists are “working at the cellular, genetic, and molecular 
levels in living organisms to identify genetic expression, to reveal the origins and 
progression of disease, and to make connections between the two and develop drugs 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 percent of all diagnoses are inaccurate, and the advent of genomics has made the practice of medicine 
more complicated since then.  GROOPMAN,THINK, supra note 2, at 24.  As explained by Dr. Groopman,  
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*** 
Medicine is, at its core, an uncertain science. 
GROOPMAN, supra note 2, at 5, 7 (2008).  
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based upon those connections.”152  Although the underlying science has shifted in the 
direction of genetic precision over the last few decades, law-policy norms and standards 
have not evolved in a commensurate fashion:  “Under the present law-policy scheme, 
drug review is too lenient, practical understanding of new pharmaceuticals is too limited, 
and market approval invites excessive off-label use—an approach that muddles clinical 
care with clinical research excessively, and exacerbates the unpredictability of 
prescription medications.”153 
 
In addition to its nature, how drug development science is done has changed 
intrinsically over the last few decades.  Contemporary drug development necessitates 
collaboration among government, academia and industry—often collaboration among 
competitors—and vast commercial investment.154   In the words of one observer, U.S. 
law and policy that promotes the commercialization of government-funded basic research 
“has turned universities into commercial entities, created a multibillion-dollar industry of 
technology transfer, and subsidized virtually every biotechnology company and discovery 
of the past twenty-five years.”155   Commercialization necessitates strong intellectual 
property protection, which has detonated an explosion of material transfer and 
confidentiality and disclosure agreements and shrouded science in secrecy to the 
detriment of the public nature of science that was the governing academic research norm 
during the decades before.156 Also, “The science publications depended upon for scrutiny, 
accountability, and human health assessment too have embraced commercialization—
evident by conflicts of interest controversies and the journals’ imposition of high cost 
barriers to access their publications.” 157    Moreover, industry has augmented its influence 
over both government and the general public expansively during the last few decades—
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the former over its lobbying presence,158 user fees paid to finance the FDA review of its 
products,159 and alliances with patient groups and the medical profession,160 and the latter 
through aggressive direct-to-consumer marketing.161  Secrecy prevails, reliability of the 
peer review mechanism is unreliable, and the integrity of research is subject to 
question:162   
 
The vast capacity to publish research and to share knowledge is tainted by 
conflicts of interest which threaten the reliability and integrity of the peer review 
process and, consequently, the underlying research. Governments, professional 
societies, and most science journals have failed to introduce the mechanisms 
necessary to manage conflicts of interest in an era of aggressive 
commercialization with meaningful confidence.   
 
Arguably, “government interventions are necessary to protect and preserve the public 
nature of science, which is essential to shore up the contemporary science enterprise.”163   
 
 Both Congress and the current administration are concerned enough about the 
state of drug development to take action.  The Obama Administration has announced 
formation of a new center, funded with a billion dollars, to help private industry develop 
new drugs under the direction of Francis Collins, the present Director of NIH and leader 
of the government effort to map the human genome. 164 Congress enacted the Food and 
Drug Administration Amendment Act of 2007 (FDAAA)165 —“the most momentous shift 
in drug regulation in half a century.”166  Under the FDAAA, premarket clinical studies 
are augmented and evidentiary standards demand culling more data from them, but their 
limitations also are recognized.   FDAAA calls for the FDA to establish an expansive 
postmarket risk identification and analysis Internet-based system, known as the Sentinal 
Nework, to disseminate risk information to patients and health care providers in an 
ongoing manner.167 
                                                 
158
 The PDUFA legislation and user fee system are addressed infra in notes 108-110, 119, and the 
accompanying text.  Commentators have estimated that there are as many as four lobbyists working in 
Washington, DC on behalf of the pharmaceutical sector for every member of Congress.  Who’s Sick in 
America?, 20/20, ABC News (2006);  ANGELL, supra note 7.  Seee generally Thomas, Vioxx Story, supra 
note , at 365.   
159
 See supra notes 110, 118 and accompanying text. 
160
 See supra notes 8, 119 and accompanying text. 
161
 See supra notes 5, 115 and accompanying text. 
See supra notes __ and accompanying text.   
162
 See generally Malinowski, Discourse, supra note 20, at 2-24.   
163
 Id. at 23. 
164
 See Gardiner Harris, New Federal Research Center Will Help Develop Medicines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 
2011, at A1.   
165
 Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
166
 Evans, Seven Pillars, supra note 46, at 423.  See generally id.; Barbara J. Evans, Authority of the Food 
and Drug Administration to Require Data Access and Control Use Rights in the Sentinel Data Network, 65 
FOOD & DRUG L. J. 67 (2010). 
167
 FDAAA, § 915, 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(r) (West Supp. 2009).  See generally FDA, The Sentinel Initiative : 
An Update on FDA’s Progress in Building a National Electronic System for Monitoring the Postmarket 
Safety of FDA-Approved Drugs and Other Medical Products (July 2010), available at 
 30
  
IV. A LAW-POLICY PRESCRIPTION 
The practice of medicine and drug R&D have changed immensely over the last half 
century,168 but excessive physician discretion to prescribe medications off label lingers 
on—to the detriment of drug innovation and human health.169  The Institute of Medicine, 
the Government Accountability Office, the National Institutes of Health, and Congress 
have recognized this prescription drug dilemma—culminating in the FDAAA and the 
new billion-dollar government research center that will attempt to resurrect drug research 
abandoned by industry.170  Physician autonomy, including discretion to prescribe drugs 
off label, dates back to the establishment of the drug application approval requirement in 
the 1960s,171 and the two complemented each other for decades.172  Times have changed: 
broad discretion to prescribe off label is inconsistent with the reality of contemporary 
drug development and the delivery of health care.173   
 
Although science is shifting in the direction of genetic precision, the drug 
development pipeline is lengthy and winding, and the transition is ongoing and 
incomplete.174   Some element of physician discretion to prescribe off-label is necessary 
during the evolution of drug development science into the genomics era, but the historic 
level invites a race to the bottom—both in medicine and drug development.175  The 
standard for delivery of care must be modified and the regulatory standard for new drug 
approvals must be raised so that more drug discovery is shifted from clinical care to 
clinical research.  Variables driving the need for this law-policy change include 
contemporary science capabilities, the proliferation of adverse drug events, drug 
ineffectiveness, the need to choose among treatment options, the increasing complexity 
of biopharmaceuticals, health care cost pressures, and the vulnerability of patients—
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seekers of care, not research participants under the scrutiny of regulations to protect 
human subjects.176 
 
Several trends suggest that such law-policy change is inevitable, and that drug 
sponsors should expect more scrutiny and demands for accountability from regulators, 
the medical community, and the general public.  These trends include rising health care 
finance pressures, federal and state, domestic and international;177  increased transparency 
of market performance and market behavior through internet communication, including 
organized observation through patient and consumer protection groups; and pressure on 
the FDA to increase post-marketing regulation requirements and general enforcement.178  
However, given the extent to which physician discretion over use of prescription 
pharmaceuticals is entrenched in the legislation enabling the FDA179 and has been 
affirmed and assured repeatedly, including in the enactment of FDAMA,180 
comprehensive direct limitations on physician discretion to prescribe off-label would 
require an expansive law-policy intervention and invite legal challenges.181  Any such 
proposal would trigger united opposition from the physician community and the 
biopharmaceutical sectors with their expansive lobbying resources.182  Similarly, using 
the regulatory process to attempt to impose commercial uses on new drug candidates or 
specific types of human clinical trials on drug developers would invite allegations of 
undue impediment on the commercial freedom that is the touchstone of our private 
market system and introduce susceptibility to legal challenges.183   
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There are several more viable law-policy options, each of which is addressed below.  
The first is to fully utilize the FDAAA to generate earlier and more complete information 
about new drugs under direct FDA oversight.  This approach, coupled with greater FDA 
enforcement of existing market checks and utilization of the added market control 
mechanisms introduced by the FDAAA, would leave physicians with less off-label 
discretion.  Another option is to raise the technical clinical trial science standard for drug 
approval and post-market clinical trials to generate more information about drugs through 
the regulatory process.  This added information would be fodder to raise the drug 
approval standard and utilize market use restrictions, including those under the FDAAA, 
which would force drug sponsors to rely less on off-label use and marketing.   Given that 
market return drives the commercial biopharmaceutical sectors, another option is to 
condition reimbursement for off-label uses of pharmaceuticals under Medicare and 
Medicaid, in the health insurance plans covering federal employees, and through national 
health care reform. 
 
A. RAISE THE SCIENCE STANDARD 
The biopharmaceutical sectors have the resources and capabilities to meet a higher 
science standard in clinical research.  Although the profits of yesterday’s investors will 
not pay for today’s and tomorrow’s drug development, the pharmaceutical industry has 
been the most profitable sector for well over a half century, and today’s 
biopharmaceutical sectors have tremendous resources and invest tens of billions in drug 
R&D annually.184  In fact, arguably adhering to a science standard that is too low is 
wasting their vast resources through poor decision making, failures, class action 
litigation, and lost opportunities in drug development.185  Moreover, although drug 
developers spend tens of millions of dollars on research, they spend more on marketing—
and much of that to encourage physicians to exercise their discretion to use their drugs 
off label.186   
 
The imposition of a higher science standard in clinical research could be a means to 
raise the level of discovery in premarket drug development and deliver drugs to market 
with more direction and less physician off-label discretion.  The low hanging fruit in drug 
development is gone, science is much more complicated, and a more rigorous science 
standard for clinical research is needed to reach higher.187  Approaches could center on 
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the scope of clinical research required, a content-driven standard for human clinical 
research, or a combination of the two.       
 
Congress has recognized the drug underdevelopment problem and has mandated a 
higher science standard through the FDAAA, but its solution is to do more with the same 
technical human clinical trials methodology.188  The core methodology of the FDAAA, 
still to be fully implemented, is to expand clinical studies before market approval and to 
extensively augment market data collection from and dissemination of information to 
physicians through Sentinel, an expansive data collection and dissemination system 
among the FDA, physicians, and patients.189  A plain reading of the FDAAA, which 
opens many possibilities subject to implementation,190 is a level of acceptance of the 
limitations of the clinical trial process that puts drugs on the market, though the FDAAA 
will expand that process,191 and belief that drawing more information from the physician-
patient experience into the regulatory process with enhanced FDA market presence will 
shore up the reliability of prescription drugs.192  To juxtapose the present with the 
FDAAA future, the core FDAAA approach calls for more of the same in clinical trials 
before the FDAAA,193 and essentially pushes physicians and their patients even more into 
a research mode outside the scope of regulations to protect human subjects.194  To 
establish the Sentinel network and achieving the extensive physician participation the 
approach is premised upon is a lofty, arguably unrealistic, goal in the foreseeable future, 
especially given the discretion allotted physicians over prescription drugs, federal and 
state medical privacy laws, and the proprietary nature of the information at issue, and 
cost.195  As explained by Professor Evans,196 
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Frankly, the concern is not whether FDA will over-share access to Sentinel data.  
The concern is that FDA may fail to ensure the level of access Congress 
envisioned.  In recent years FDA has tended to favor a consensual model of 
regulation, a sort of regulation by consent of the regulated, and has shown a 
certain reluctance to flex compulsory power. 
 
The provisions of the FDAAA that call for the FDA to pull more discovery into 
the premarket approval process and then approve market use with many more conditions 
on physician use is not consistent with the known realities of drug discovery and 
delivery—which depends heavily on learning from the physician-patient experience.197  
She also approaches the FDAAA with thoughtful practicality and raises numerous 
considerations about the implementation of Sentinel.198  A fundamental weakness in the 
FDAAA is that its Sentinel approach assumes a metamorphosis in the culture of the 
practice of medicine—a change in entrenched norms that make broad off-label discretion 
dangerous to human health.  In sum, the vast majority of practicing physicians are not 
clinical researchers, and the disciplines are wholly distinguishable when it comes to 
handling information.  As explained by Dr. Davit Gratzer, the Sentinel approach works 
well in theory,199 however there is a strong reality to overcome:200   
 
Doctors are reluctant to take the time to fill out lengthy drug safety reports.  Some 
have estimated that under 1 percent of adverse events are reported by doctors.  
Indeed, the FDA has so little confidence in safety information coming from 
physicians’ offices that they have a full-time staff whose job it is to read medical 
journals for letters about drug reactions, figuring that doctors are actually more 
likely to write to a journal than to the FDA.  Meanwhile, drug companies seem to 
do the opposite, flooding the FDA with any and every possible adverse reaction, 
burying significant events in a graveyard of data.  This over-reporting creates 
distracting noise.  On top of this, the FDA largely doesn’t monitor post-approval 
side effects anyway.   
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Another reality is that the FDA’s technical science standard for human clinical 
trial research is too low, which causes seconding guessing by the agency in the 
marketplace and failure in the context of aggressive drug sponsor marketing to excessive 
physician discretion.201  As explained by Dr. Gratzer, 
 
In other words, despite the extraordinary caution of the FDA, it’s difficult to tell 
exactly how a drug affects people until it hits pharmacies.  Bromfenac is a case in 
point.  No problems had been discovered by the original clinical trials, involving 
2,500 people.  The analgesic was withdrawn after causing four deaths and 
necessitating eight liver transplants –but the medication was taken by 2.5 million 
people.202 
 
The FDA could raise its technical science standard by complementing the global gold 
standard for clinical research, group design (GD), with a single subject research design 
methodology (SSRD):203   
 
GD is based in randomized, parallel, group trials.  While GD typically focuses on 
ascertaining statistically significant variations based upon group averages, the core 
SSRD methodology is to repeat comparisons of control and treatment conditions with 
the same individual or staggered across similar individuals, graph the data on a 
subject-by-subject basis, and analyze the results.  Thus, the individual serves as her 
own control while the variables interacting between the individual and the 
environment are isolated. 
 
GD depends “upon mathematical abstracts that, although representative of the group 
collectively, may say nothing decisive about members of the group individually, let alone 
broad populations of patients with health care needs outside the group.”204  As explained 
by Dr. Gratzer: 205   
 
Call it the post-Vioxx conventional wisdom: the belief that approval standards must 
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be toughened up to ensure that America’s drugs are safe.  Indeed, many demand that 
the FDA require more clinical trials on greater number of participants, with the logic 
that the system has failed spectacularly so we should embrace the system more 
zealously.  Here’s the FDA’s dirty little secret: clinical trials involve a relatively 
homogenous group of healthy individuals who collectively are totally 
unrepresentative of the people who actually take pharmaceuticals.  The FDA doesn’t 
need to raise the bar higher, it needs to rethink drug safety. 
Abstracts based on group averages put drugs on the market, “But, in fact, few if any 
physicians work with this mathematical paradigm.  The physical examination begins with 
the first visual impression in the waiting room, and with the tactile feedback gained by 
shaking a person’s hand.  Hypotheses about the diagnosis come to a doctor’s mind even 
before a word of the medical history is spoken.”206 
 
SSRD would heighten appreciation for human variability and individuality, innate to 
the practice of medicine, in the human clinical research that puts and keeps drugs on the 
market. 207  A major practical advantage of SSRD over GD is that “It overcomes some of 
the inherent limitations found in large-scale clinical trials, in that treatments are tailored 
for unique individuals and can also be modified over time."208  SSRD could be 
implemented in conjunction with FDAAA, especially through the latter’s provisions that 
require much more detailed information gathering and interface with physicians for Phase 
IV trials and market use.209  This union could be extremely beneficial to the practice of 
medicine directly, as well as through improvements to drug development:210   
 
Research supports the effectiveness of the single subject design, from studying 
treatments for rare patient populations to providing N-of-1 trial services in 
assisting physicians.  The single subject design is an innovative addition to the 
arsenal of available methodologies for primary care physicians, biomedical 
students, residents, medical research faculty, clinical practitioners, among others.  
Consistent with the NIH Roadmap Initiative, increasing awareness of the utility in 
the single subject design could enhance treatment approach and evaluation both in 
biomedical research and primary care settings. 
 
 SSRD would require modification of the entrenched GD gold standard and, though 
the FDAAA expands the FDA’s authority to demand more clinical research as a 
prerequisite for market approval, the legislation arguably is overwhelming, its 
effectiveness is subject to FDA enforcement, and it still has not been fully implemented 
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and subject to the potential court challenges that will arise.211  According to past 
experience and legal precedent, the means most likely to achieve a higher science 
standard for human clinical research are commercial incentives, direct government 
involvement in the research, or some combination of the two. 
  
Commercial incentive-based programs to get desired clinical research done have 
proven effective and they have endured the threat of legal challenges.  The most noted 
examples are the Orphan Drug Act (ODA) and the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act 
(BPCA).212  The FDA has successfully used ODA and BPCA to get needed clinical 
research done on small disease groups and children—research that industry avoided.  
ODA is a rewards-based program.   The ODA methodology is to make drug development 
for small groups of patients commercially viable, and the mechanisms it employs are tax 
incentives, a seven-year period of market exclusivity, and other benefits.213  ODA is 
working, and has been copied by other countries.214    
 
BPCA is legislation enacted to enable the FDA to get pediatric studies done and to 
recover from litigation challenging the FDA’s attempt to force them.215   The FDA 
introduced an incentive-based program—pediatric studies in exchange for six months of 
market exclusivity.  When the FDA attempted to demand the studies for the same reword, 
litigation ensued and the FDA lost.216  Congress stepped in to introduce an alternative:  
funding for the FDA through a trust to get pediatric studies done on its own and 
independent of commercial drug sponsors.217  BPCA has worked to the extent that more 
pediatric studies are being done in spite of industry aversion to them.218   
 
The BPCA approach of the government directly funding needed research is an 
effective method for trumping legal challenges and moving science forward.  The federal 
government has founded a new center to help cure the drug development dilemma by 
resurrecting drug development research abandoned by industry. 219   The center will be 
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headed by Dr. Francis Collins, Director of the NIH and head of the U.S. Government 
effort to map the human genome, and its mission is to transition the accomplishment of 
the map of the human genome into human health applications.220  The scope of the center 
could and should be expanded to engage in clinical research with a SSRD component.221  
A major criticism of BPCA is the cost to taxpayers when the government directly 
engages in clinical research in conjunction with a new drug proposal. 222 However, the 
drug dilemma is costly—in terms of both human health and the U.S. economy.  
Investment in SSRD to turn the clinical trial gold standard into platinum would be 
justified given the enormous annual investment U.S. taxpayers make in biomedical 
research through NIH and other agencies, and the importance of the success of the U.S. 
biopharmaceutical R&D endeavor.223 
 
B.  UTILIZE FDAAA MECHANISMS 
There are regulatory mechanisms in FDAAA that could effectively limit physician 
discretion to prescribe off-label and thereby push drug developers to achieve more during 
the premarket drug R&D process.   Much depends upon how the FDAAA is implemented 
and enforced.224  First, the extra data generated under the FDAAA, both through 
expanded pre-market trials and Sentinel,225 would give the FDA the means to issue black 
box warnings and to demand notice of them through the dissemination component of 
Sentinel.  The latter would affirm notice to physicians and potentially raise liability for 
ignoring black box warnings.  The FDA has been utilizing the black box mechanism 
more frequently in recent years to reign in prescription pharmaceutical use, including off-
label use.226  The black box—in literal terms, a black border around a written warning—
is a visible sign that appears on package inserts for prescription drugs, which flags the 
danger of serious adverse events.227  These warnings, which the FDA may impose on rug 
labels or package inserts, flag that a drug carries significant risk of serious or even life-
threatening adverse effects; it is the strongest warning the FDA may issue.228  The FDA is 
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much more inclined to issue black box warnings on new drugs over older ones.229 A 
current estimate is that twenty percent of all drugs receive a black-box warning.230 
 
Two other FDAAA mechanisms that could be employed to tailor existing off-label 
uses are the Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) and product cross-label 
provisions.231  The FDAAA grants the FDA statutory authority to condition drug sales 
through REMS.232  Through the FDA’s cross-labeling authority under FDAAA, the FDA 
has authority to impose pharmacogenomics  (new drug market access associated with 
genetic screening)—most notably given tends in the underlying drug development 
science, tie new drugs with associated genetic screens.233       
 
Collectively, these mechanisms, with an information flow from Sentinel if that is 
successfully and meaningfully implemented,234 could check the 506(B) presumption in 
favor of market access with substantive knowledge about drugs on the market.235  
Hopefully, pushed by Congress through the FDAAA, the FDA will accomplish more 
quality control.   
 
C. CONDITION REIMBURSEMENT FOR OFF-LABEL USES 
Drug development, as any other highly commercial endeavor, centers on market 
return—meaning physician-patient use and reimbursement.   There are mechanisms in the 
established health care system to shift from traditional off-label use to use controlled by 
clinical data, but mounting health care finance pressures and ongoing reform, federal and 
state, open a door to a dimension of additional possibilities.  There are pending legal and 
finance challenges to PPACA, but the legislation has been enacted, it is expansive 
(2,700+ pages) which suggests that at least some provisions will sustain legal challenges, 
and states do not have the luxury of waiting to see what happens with PPACA and are 
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into the process of trying to comply—meaning that health care reform, federal and state, 
is underway.236       
 
Under the established health care system, control over off-label use could be 
introduced through reimbursement restrictions under Medicare and Medicaid and the 
health insurance provided to federal employees.  The pressures to cut health care costs 
are enormous—evident in the enactment of the PPACA.237  Editing reimbursement of 
off-label uses of pharmaceuticals makes sense on the levels of quality of care and cost 
savings.  Industry should be pressured to engage in clinical research commensurate with 
actual clinical use and reimbursement.  When an administration makes categorical 
changes regarding health care reimbursement for federal employees, the full portfolio of 
private health insurers servicing them adopts the policies and they make their way into 
the general public’s policies as standard of care and coverage consistency.238            
PPACA introduces two new mechanisms that could be implemented to directly 
curtail off-label uses of pharmaceuticals:  the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Innovation to test new ways of delivering care to patients, and an Independent Payment 
Board239 to target waste in the system and recommend ways to reduce costs, improve 
health outcomes, and expand access to high quality care.240 The IPAB—slated to consist 
of fifteen experts, including doctors and patient advocates nominated by the President 
and confirmed by the senate—is a backstop that will take effect only if Medicare costs 
grow too fast.241  However, trends suggest that is inevitable.242  IPAB will make 
recommendations to Congress to promote cost and quality of care, which Congress may 
accept or reject.243   If Congress opts to reject and Medicare spending surpasses specific 
targets (which it likely will based upon current trends),244 it must enact policies that 
achieve equivalent savings or let the Secretary of Health and Human Services follow 
IPAB’s recommendations.  The IPAB is a wonderful opportunity to check physician off-
label use of pharmaceuticals in the absence of supportive clinical data and to promote 
SSRD. 
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 The PPACA also establishes an Innovation Center authorized to test innovative 
care and payment models.245  Congress created the Innovation Center under the 
Affordable Care Act, giving the Center the authority and direction to “test innovative 
payment and service delivery models to reduce program expenditures, while preserving 
or enhancing the quality of care”246 for those who get Medicare, Medicaid or Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) benefits.   Congress funded the Center with $10 billion 
for 2011 through 2019.  The goal is to raise the quality and value of care, which is in sync 
with the law-policy proposals put forth in this article to edit physician discretion to use 
pharmaceuticals outside the scope of the data that puts them on the market and raise the 
science standard for new drug approval. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Testimony before Congress about the unreliability of prescription drugs, like 
testimony over the birth control pill in 1972, triggered significant law-policy change, 
sweeping FDAAA legislation—though the recent testimony failed to capture the same 
public attention.247  Unfortunately, the FDAAA does not break cleanly from the legacy of 
excessive physician discretion to prescribe pharmaceuticals off label, meaning 
prescribing drugs beyond the scope of FDA market approvals and the data that puts drugs 
on the market.248  Traditional off-label discretion, a hold-over from the middle of the last 
century, draws drug developers into investing resources in marketing rather than clinical 
research249 and invites physicians to experiment on their patients well outside the scope 
of research standards, including regulations to protect human subjects.250 
 
A major premise of this article is that the broad off-label usage norms are 
antiquated—a reflection of the crude science past in pharmaceutical R&D and 
paternalism in the practice of medicine, which are not consistent with the present 
consumer-driven era in medicine and contemporary genetics.  This article proposes 
utilizing existing mechanisms and implementing the FDAAA to limit physician off-label 
discretion through a heightened regulatory standard for introducing pharmaceuticals to 
patients in need of care.  Patients, like the physicians writing their prescriptions, are 
engaged in clinical care, not clinical research, and when subjected to prescriptions off-
label are drawn outside the scope of the clinical data putting drugs on pharmacy shelves 
and regulations to protect human subjects.  Today’s Dr. Marcus Welby should take fewer 
liberties and demand more data.    
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